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On July 22, 2009, a five-member arbitral tribunal, operating under the Permanent Court
of Arbitration’s Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only
One Is a State, rendered its 4-1 decision in the excess-of-mandate and boundary-delimitation
case between the government of Sudan (Government) and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A).1 The tribunal was asked (1) to determine whether the Abyei
Boundaries Commission (ABC) Experts (Experts) had, in their final report2 (Report),
exceeded their mandate, which was “to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka
Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905,”3 and, if so, (2) to delimit that region, known as
the Abyei area (see map). The tribunal found that the Experts had not exceeded their mandate
with respect to the southern boundary of the Abyei area, the northern limit of permanent Ngok
Dinka habitation, or the survival of established secondary (seasonal) rights on either side of the
northern boundary. The tribunal did find, however, that the Experts had exceeded their man-
date with respect to the delimitation of the area of shared secondary rights in the north, and
with respect to the delimitation of the northern, western, and eastern boundaries of the Abyei
area for failing to state sufficient reasons for how they implemented their mandate. The tri-
bunal accepted the possibility of a partial nullity of the Experts’ Report and set aside only those
decisions in the Report that were rendered in excess of the Experts’ mandate. In particular, the
tribunal delimited new boundaries in the east and west, and ruled that, while the defined area
1 Gov’t of Sudan v. Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (“Abyei Arbitration”) (Arb. Trib. July 22,
2009). The award and dissenting opinion by Judge Al-Khasawneh are contained in separate files on the Web site
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, http://www.pca-cpa.org. The optional rules are also available on the PCA
Web site.
2 Abyei Boundaries Commission Report ( July 14, 2005) [hereinafter ABC Report], at http://www.sudanarchive.
net. Appendix 1 of the ABC Report includes the Abyei Protocol (Protocol Between the Government of Sudan (GoS)
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict, May 26, 2004)
(Appendix 1.1), Abyei Appendix (Understanding on Abyei Boundaries Commission, Dec. 17, 2004) (Appendix
1.2), Terms of Reference (Appendix 1.3), and Rules of Procedure (Appendix 1.4). The ABC consisted of fifteen
individuals, five appointed by each of the parties and “five impartial experts knowledgeable in history, geography
and any other relevant expertise.” These last five were the “ABC Experts.” Abyei Appendix, supra, para. 2.
3 Abyei Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 5.1. This phrase is referred to throughout the award (see para. 95) as the
“Formula.”
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of shared secondary rights was a nullity, “the exercise of established traditional rights within
or in the vicinity of the Abyei Area . . . remain[ed] unaffected” (para. 770).
In 1905, in the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, a transfer was made
between Bahr el Ghazal Province and Kordofan Province intended to bring the Ngok Dinka
(one of a collection of Dinka tribes) under the same provincial administration as their nomadic
neighbors to the north, the Humr Arabs (a subgroup of the Misseriya). For several years prior
to the transfer, the Dinka had complained of raids by the Humr (para. 637). The Condomin-
ium officials, in the interest of pacification, thought it “advisable to place them under the same
Governor as the Arabs of whose conduct they complained” (para. 616, quoting Sudan Intel-
ligence Report, March 1905). The effect of this transfer was to shift southward the ill-defined
provincial boundary between Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan, with the result that the Ngok
Dinka were encompassed within the reconfigured Kordofan Province.4
It is clear, in retrospect, that this provincial redistricting along the volatile cultural fault line
dividing Arab (northern) and African (southern) areas of Sudan did not have the desired paci-
fying effect. The first of two civil wars between northern and southern Sudan began around
the time that Sudan achieved independence in January 1956 (para. 108). The first civil war—in
4 The Experts found that “no map exists showing the area inhabited by the Ngok Dinka in 1905. Nor is there
sufficient documentation produced in that year by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government authorities that
adequately spell out the administrative situation that existed in that area at that time.” ABC Report, supra note 2,
at 4. The tribunal further described the uncertainty of the Bahr el Ghazal–Kordofan boundary at paragraphs 618
to 623.
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which the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka participated on opposite sides—ended in 1972 with the
Addis Ababa Agreement. In 1983, however, after a tenuous eleven-year peace, that agreement
fell apart, leading to another civil war, in which “the Abyei Area [was] said to be at the geo-
graphical center” (para. 109). This second civil war officially ended with the signing in January
2005 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,5 although sporadic unrest has continued since
then.6 With that agreement the parties reconfirmed their commitment to previous agreements,
which included the Machakos Protocol signed in July 2002 and the Abyei Protocol and its
annex, the Abyei Appendix, signed in May and December 2004, respectively.7
The Machakos Protocol established the process by which, after a six-month pre-interim
period followed by a six-year interim period, an “internationally monitored referendum”
would be held in southern Sudan to decide whether “to confirm the unity of Sudan . . . or to
vote for secession.”8 The pre-interim period began in January 2005, and the referendum is
anticipated in 2011. The Abyei Protocol called for a parallel referendum to be held simulta-
neously with the referendum for southern Sudan. Pursuant to paragraph 1.3 of protocol, the
referendum “will present the residents of Abyei with the following choices, irrespective of
the results of the southern referendum: a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in
the north; b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal.” If southern Sudan were to secede, some
segments of the Abyei area boundary under consideration in this arbitration would be trans-
formed into an international boundary (see para. 428).
The Abyei Protocol, in paragraph 5.1, also called for the establishment of the “Abyei Bound-
aries Commission . . . to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms
transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” The Abyei Appendix elaborated on the composition of the
Abyei Boundaries Commission and provided additional guidance on the methodology that the
ABC was to use in carrying out its mandate. For example, the ABC was required “to listen to
representatives of the people of the Abyei Area and their neighbours” and to “‘listen to pre-
sentations of the two Parties’ and to ‘consult the British Archives and other relevant sources on
Sudan wherever they may be available, with a view to arriving at a decision that shall be based
on scientific analysis and research’” (para. 116, quoting Abyei Appendix). The Experts’ Report,
the final product envisioned in this process, “shall be final and binding.”9 The ABC drew up
terms of reference and rules of procedure over the months following the January 2005 signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The ABC Experts started their work in mid-April
2005 and presented their final Report to the Presidency in July 2005. Included in the Report
was the Experts’ five-point decision, which read, in part:
Having duly considered, assessed, and weighed the evidence before them, the experts
have come to the following decision:
5 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Jan. 9, 2005, at http://www.sudanarchive.net. Chapter 1
of this agreement is the Machakos Protocol, see infra text accompanying notes 7–8.
6 In particular, violent clashes in May 2008 destroyed Abyei Town. This incident is most likely the one that Judge
Al-Khasawneh refers to in his critique (dissent, para. 193) of the Experts’ decision: “By proceeding as they did, they
in fact derailed that peace process and caused a conflict in which Abyei itself was destroyed.”
7 See supra note 2.
8 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, supra note 5, ch.1, para 2.5.
9 Abyei Appendix, supra note 2, para. 5.
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(1) The Ngok have a legitimate dominant claim to the territory from the Kordofan-
Bahr el Ghazal boundary north to latitude 10°10 N . . . ;
(2) North of latitude 10°10N, through the Goz up to and including Tebeldia (north
of latitude 10°35 N) the Ngok and Misseriya share isolated occupation and use
rights, dating from at least the Condominium period. This gave rise to shared sec-
ondary rights for both the Ngok and Misseriya;
(3) The two parties lay equal claim to the shared areas and accordingly it is reasonable
and equitable to divide the Goz between them and locate the northern boundary
in a straight line at approximately latitude 10°2230 N. The western boundary
shall be the Kordofan-Darfur boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956. The
southern boundary shall be the Kordofan–Bahr el Ghazal–Upper Nile boundary as
it was defined on 1 January 1956. The eastern boundary shall extend the line of the
Kordofan–Upper Nile boundary at approximately longitude 29°3225 E north-
wards until it meets latitude 10°2230 N;
(4) The northern and eastern boundaries will be identified and demarcated by a survey
team . . . ;
(5) The Ngok and Misseriya shall retain their established secondary rights to the use
of land north and south of this boundary. (Report, p. 21)
The Government rejected the Experts’ decision, and disagreement soon arose as to whether
the Experts had exceeded their mandate. During the subsequent three years, the parties nego-
tiated the Abyei Road Map, signed in June 2008, which included the commitment to refer the
Abyei dispute to arbitration.10 In July 2008, the parties signed the Arbitration Agreement that
led to the formation of the tribunal and to this decision.11
The tribunal’s mandate is set out in Article 2 of the agreement. It reads:
The issues that shall be determined by the Tribunal are the following:
a. Whether or not the ABC [E]xperts had, on the basis of the agreement of the Parties
as per the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement], exceeded their mandate which is “to
define (i.e. delimit) and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms
transferred to Kordofan in 1905” as stated in the Abyei Protocol, and reiterated in
the Abyei Appendix and the ABC Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure.
b. If the Tribunal determines, pursuant to Sub-article (a) herein, that the ABC
[E]xperts did not exceed their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that ef-
fect and issue an award for the full and immediate implementation of the ABC
Report.
c. If the Tribunal determines, pursuant to Sub-article (a) herein, that the ABC
[E]xperts exceeded their mandate, it shall make a declaration to that effect, and shall
proceed to define (i.e. delimit) on map the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok
Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, based on the submissions of the
Parties. (Award, para. 395, quoting Arbitration Agreement, Art. 2)
10 The Road Map for Return of IDPs and Implementation of Abyei Protocol, Khartoum, June 8, 2008,
para. 4.1, at http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/2008Docs/Abyei%20Roadmap.pdf.
11 Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army on Delimiting Abyei Area, July 7, 2008 [hereinafter Arbitration Agreement], at http://www.pca-cpa.org.
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The tribunal interpreted its mandate to consist of “two distinct and contingent stages,
comprising two distinct juridical tasks”: to “determine whether the ABC Experts had exceeded
their mandate” (Art. 2(a)), and, if so, to delimit the Abyei area on de novo review of the evi-
dence (Art. 2(c)) (paras. 397–98). While the tribunal’s task under Article 2(c) was contin-
gent on its determination under Article 2(a), the proceedings were not separated into two
phases.
In the proceedings before the tribunal, the Government argued for a broad interpretation
of the phrase “excess of mandate” that would include both procedural and substantive excesses
(para. 139), whereas the SPLM/A argued for a narrow interpretation of excess of mandate that
would include only decisions taken ultra petita (para. 140). The Government argued that the
Experts had exceeded their mandate, inter alia, by going beyond (ultra petita) or failing to
answer (infra petita) the question agreed to by the parties (para.165) and by failing to provide
reasons capable of forming the basis of a valid decision (para. 192), whereas the SPLM/A argued
that the Experts had not exceeded their mandate in any respect. The Government argued that
the Experts would have exceeded their mandate if their interpretation of that mandate was not
correct (para. 491), whereas the SPLM/A argued for a more deferential, “reasonableness” stan-
dard of review (para. 492). Finally, the Government argued that any finding of excess of man-
date should cause the tribunal to set aside the entire Report and to delimit the boundaries
anew under Art. 2(c) (para. 413), whereas the SPLM/A argued that the Experts’ decision was
severable and that those parts decided within the Experts’ mandate should remain intact
(para. 413).
The tribunal divided its Article 2(a) analysis into two parts: the Experts’ interpretation of
their mandate and the Experts’ implementation of it (para. 486). The tribunal first concluded
that “reasonableness” was the appropriate standard of review for both the interpretation and
implementation of the mandate. On the question of severability or partial nullity, the tribunal
concluded “that certain discrete . . . findings or conclusions of the ABC Experts . . . which are
not fundamentally related to other findings or conclusions” could be set aside while the rest of
the Report remained intact (para. 424). The parties presented the tribunal with two possible
interpretations of the Experts’ mandate: a “tribal interpretation” focused on the people trans-
ferred in 1905 (“the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred”) and a “territorial interpreta-
tion” focused on the territory involved in the transfer (“the area . . . transferred”), specifically
the area bounded by the pre-1905 Bahr el Ghazal–Kordofan boundary.12 The Experts had
worked on the basis of a “tribal interpretation” of their mandate, sleuthing out the configu-
rations of Ngok Dinka habitation and land use circa 1905.13 Members of the tribunal disagreed
among themselves whether that interpretation was correct (para. 666), but a four-member
majority agreed that it was not an unreasonable interpretation and found no excess of mandate
with respect to the Experts’ interpretation (para. 582).
As the second part of its Article 2(a) analysis, the tribunal turned to the Experts’ implemen-
tation of their mandate. Here, too, reasonableness was the standard of review. Moreover, the
12 “The Tribunal acknowledges that a ‘territorial interpretation’ of the Formula, pursuant to which more sig-
nificance would have been conferred to the provincial boundary (albeit approximate and uncertain), could also have
been reasonably justified” (para. 671).
13 “The area to be defined is described in the protocol as the area of the 9 Ngok Dinka chiefdoms—no one else.
And we are supposed to discover what territory was being used and claimed by those 9 chiefdoms when the administrative
decision was made to place them in Kordofan” (para. 565, quoting the ABC Report, supra note 2, pt. 2 at 155–56).
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tribunal concluded that it was beyond its competence to review the Experts’ decision for sub-
stantive error14 (paras. 512–17). The tribunal did find, however, that the duty to state the rea-
sons for their decisions was integral to the Experts’ mandate (paras. 519–25) and that a failure
to state reasons “could constitute an excess of mandate” (para. 525). While the tribunal’s
scope of review under Article 2(a) was limited, it did include the task of “verify[ing] whether
the ABC Experts’ Report contain[ed] sufficient explication to allow the reader to understand
how the ABC Experts reached each conclusion of their “final and binding decision” (regardless
of whether these explanations are persuasive or the decision was right)” (para. 535). The tri-
bunal discerned, primarily from annulment committee decisions under the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Con-
vention), therequiredminimumstandardandconcludedthat“awardsmaybesetaside for failure to
state reasons where conclusions are not supported by any reasons at all, where reasoning is incoher-
ent or where the reasons provided are obviously contradictory or frivolous” (para. 531).
The tribunal applied these minimum requirements to the reasoning in the Experts’ Report
and found the reasoning insufficient with respect to the northern limit of the shared rights area
at 10°35N, the northern boundary of the Abyei area at 10°2230N (which was derived from
the northern and southern limits of the shared rights area),15 and the eastern and western
boundaries of the Abyei area.16 These findings triggered the tribunal’s Article 2(c) review of
those parts of the Experts’ decision.17
Having concluded that the Experts’ reasoning was sufficient with respect to the southern
boundary of the Abyei area and having retained the sufficiently reasoned northern limit of the
area of permanent Ngok Dinka habitation at 10°10 N as the new northern boundary of
the Abyei area,18 the tribunal was left to (re)delimit only the eastern and western boundaries.
In doing so the tribunal maintained the Experts’ “tribal interpretation” of the mandate
(para. 710) and relied on the best available evidence for the eastern and western limits of the
Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred in 1905. Among this evidence was a document by Paul
Howell, a British district commissioner and anthropologist, that identified the western and
eastern limits of the Ngok Dinka at “approximately Long. 27°50 and Long. 29°” (para. 721,
quoting Howell). Other evidence corroborated Howell’s western and eastern limits, and the
14 Additionally: “It appears that the Parties did not expect or authorize the Tribunal to make any definitive sub-
stantive determination . . . as to the ABC Experts’ correctness of fact or law with respect to its delimitation of the
Abyei Area in 1905” (para. 398).
15 These conclusions were “not supported by sufficient reasons” (para. 697).
16 Here, too, the Experts’ reasoning was insufficient, and in the case of the western boundary, the Experts failed
“to state any reasons at all” (para. 708).
17 The parties had argued their delimitation positions in the course of the proceedings. The Government argued
that the Abyei area was “the area bounded on the north by the Bahr el-Arab and otherwise by the boundaries of
Kordofan as at independence” (para. 37, quoting Government memorial), The SPLM/A argued that, if the tribunal
found an excess of mandate, the Abyei area was defined by “the current boundary of Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal
to the south extending to 10°35 N latitude to the north and the current boundary of Kordofan and Darfur to the
west extending to [29°]3215 E longitude to the east” (para. 39, quoting SPLM/A memorial, as modified).
18 In the ABC Report the northern limit of the area of permanent habitation of the Ngok Dinka at 10°10 N
formed the southern limit of the shared rights area. It appears that the 10°10N line became, in the award, the new
northern limit through the process of invalidating the more northerly alternatives under the Article 2(a) review
rather than through a de novo review of the evidence under Article 2(c). “By invalidating the 10°35 N and
10°2230 N lines while upholding the 10°10 N line, the Tribunal has fulfilled its mandate with respect to the
northern limit of the Abyei Area . . .” (para. 711). The dissent (para. 34; see paras. 38–39) questioned “whether that
line is in fact a mere confirmation of the Experts’ line or in essence a new line.”
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tribunal adopted these lines of longitude as the western and eastern boundaries of the Abyei
area. One effect of the annulment of the shared rights area and northern boundary, coupled
with the (re)delimitation of the eastern and western boundaries, was to diminish the total
extent of the Abyei area by approximately 8,000 square kilometers, or 45 percent.19 Finally,
although the tribunal had annulled the area of shared rights delimited by the Experts, it did not
find an excess of mandate with respect to Point 5 of the Experts’ decision,20 noting that “the
transfer of sovereignty in the context of boundary delimitation should not be construed to
extinguish traditional rights to the use of land” (para. 753).
* * * *
The result in this arbitration depended, in large part, on how the tribunal defined its review
role with respect to the sui generis ABC and the decisions set forth in the ABC Experts’ Report.
Just how to understand and define its mandate was, for the tribunal, an uncertain task requiring
careful reflection. It was an ad hoc body outside any codified system of institutional review,
reviewing a decision made by an original decision maker that had used a fundamentally dif-
ferent methodology (that is, science versus law), and situated in a quasi-international setting
where, in any event, review is the rare exception.
In order to determine the outlines of its review powers, the tribunal looked first to Article
2 of the Arbitration Agreement, which provided the primary textual basis for the tribunal’s
mandate (para. 395). With little express guidance from that agreement,21 the tribunal moved
beyond the text to a searching inquiry into the object and purpose of the arbitration, the expec-
tations of the parties, and general principles of law and practices,22 all considered against the
backdrop of the larger peace process of which the arbitration was only one part. In the course of this
inquiry, the tribunal implicitly analogized its function to that of other reviewing bodies and found
itself, for thepurposesofArticle2(a),23 mostclosely resemblinganannulmentcommittee,with lim-
ited powers of review that did not extend to reviewing the factual or legal correctness of the Experts’
decision, but only whether that decision was based on a reasonable interpretation and implemen-
tationof theExperts’mandate.24 This functionwas thus incontrast to thatofanappealbody,which
might consider errors of law and also, possibly, fact.25
19 Although much of the post-award reporting focuses on the location of oil fields relative to the ABC Report’s
boundaries and the award boundaries—the new eastern boundary excludes the major fields from the Abyei area—
there is no discussion of oil resources in the tribunal’s analysis; its decision was based on other grounds.
20 Point 5 of the ABC Report read: “The Ngok and Misseriya shall retain their established secondary rights to
the use of land north and south of this boundary.”
21 For example, with respect to the key phrase in Article 2, the tribunal noted “the paucity of authority on what
‘excess of mandate’ concretely represents in law ” (para. 401).
22 Article 3 of the Arbitration Agreement, supra note 11, called on the tribunal “to resolve the disputes before it
in accordance with the provisions of the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement], particularly the Abyei Protocol and
the Abyei Appendix, the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, 2005, and general principles of
law and practices as the Tribunal may determine to be relevant” (para. 425, emphasis added (quoting Arbitration
Agreement)).
23 The tribunal’s role under Article 2(c) as a boundary delimitation tribunal was less difficult to discern.
24 In support of this limited review role, the tribunal cited the small body of relevant ICJ jurisprudence (para. 403
& n.810, quoting Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 ICJ
REP. 192 (Nov. 18)).
25 The tribunal noted that “neither Party has asked the Tribunal to assume a review function akin to a ‘court of
appeals,’ a clear demonstration of their continued wish to circumscribe this Tribunal’s jurisdiction” (para. 411).
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Although the tribunal was formed for a specific purpose, the Arbitration Agreement and asso-
ciated agreements did not form a self-contained regime. In the process of filling gaps in the express
terms of both the Experts’ mandate and its own, the tribunal necessarily fell back on general prin-
ciples of international law, including those that guided its decisions on partial nullity under appro-
priate circumstances (paras. 416–24), traditional rights surviving territorial delimitation (paras.
753–65), the appropriate standard of review (paras. 401–03), and the minimum requirements for
stating reasons (paras. 527–31). The tribunal turned to the jurisprudence of other courts and tri-
bunals, including the InternationalCourtof Justice,W TOAppellateBody, and ICSID annulment
committees. Such inter-institutional cross-referencing can only contribute to the unification of
international law despite the potentially fragmenting effect of awards from ad hoc tribunals. In the
interest of consistency and cohesion, it can be hoped that the articulation of general principles in
this award will be cited favorably by future review bodies.26
Finally, this arbitration was also part of a larger, ongoing peace process across Sudan’s north/
south divide. Despite a rather fiery dissent that concluded “today, we are more remote from achiev-
ing a durable peace than before the rendering of this Award” (dissent, para. 203), all indications are
that both parties have accepted the award; demarcation of the Abyei area boundaries was under way
byearlySeptember2009;27 anddiscussionscontinueaboutvoting rules, inanticipationof the2011
referenda.28 It is to be hoped “that the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation visible throughout
[the] proceedings . . . will continue to animate the Parties on this matter” (para. 769).
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On March 2, 2009, Trial Chamber I of the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued its judg-
ment in Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon & Augustine Gbao (Trial), widely known
26 In the latest ICSID matter concerning annulment—Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Annulment, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/12 (Sept. 1, 2009), in which one of the possible grounds for annulment was failure to state rea-
sons—the committee members did not cite the current award, but this lack of reference may reflect the fact that
the award was published only five weeks before the ICSID decision.
27 Abyei Chief Administrator Pledges to Support Border Technical Demarcation Team (Sept. 11, 2009), at
http://www.sudantribune.com. Unfortunately, as of December 2009, actual demarcation of the Abyei area has pro-
ceeded slowly, having been hindered by the presence of armed groups opposed to the demarcation. Of the antic-
ipated twenty-eight boundary markers, only four had been placed as of early December. [Sudan’s First Vice President]
Accuses [National Congress Party] of Hindering Abyei Boundary Demarcation (Dec. 3, 2009), at http://unmis.
unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/MMR/MMR%203%20Dec%2009.pdf.
28 [SPLM/A] and [National Congress Party] Resume Talks on South Sudan Referendum (Sept. 14, 2009), at
http://www.sudantribune.com.
2010] 73INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
